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TWO "COLORED"+ WOMEN'S 
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OF FEMINIST LAW JOURNALS IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURy++ 
TAUNYA LOVELL BANKS* AND PENELOPE 
ANDREws-
INTRODUCTION 
The invitation to participate in the Columbia Journal of Gender and 
Law symposium on the relevance of feminist law journals provided an ideal 
opportunity for us to reassess our collective endeavors as teachers, scholars, 
and advocates committed to social justice. Feminist methodology and 
epistemology have been instrumental in shaping our conceptual 
frameworks. So, too, have other theories of law that seek to unearth the 
structural impediments, hidden biases, and methodological limitations of 
the law in redressing injustice. 
As black women (one from the United States and the other from 
South Africa), the concerns of race have been central to our analysis of the 
world and in our decisions to be lawyers. It is through the prism of racial 
discrimination that we confronted injustice, and our early endeavors, both 
academic and practical, used law as an instrument to eliminate injustice. 
Feminism came into our lives later, but it served to enrich our analysis 
about overcoming all impediments to equality. This was particularly 
important as the focus of equality both in the United States and South 
Africa served to privilege racial equality while ignoring the intersection of 
race and gender on the status of women. Feminist law journals have been an 
+ During the Apartheid era in South Africa certain "mixed-race" individuals were 
classified by the South African government as "colored" as opposed to African, Indian, or 
white. At various points in United States history, people with known African ancestry either 
called themselves, or were called, "colored." Thus, we use the term "colored" in the title as 
both a descriptive and ascriptive term suggesting that sometimes cultural race, a voluntary 
identification, is so intertwined with externally imposed race, that separation of the two is 
impossible. How we see ourselves and how others see us shapes our vision of the world. 
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indispensable part of our intellectual journeys--one that we plan to 
continue on as the nature and forms of discrimination alter. 
We embarked on the conversation that follows in an attempt to 
assess the influence of feminist law journals on our lives and scholarship, 
and where we would like to see feminist law journals go in the future. 
The conversation begins: 
Taunya: One of the initial questions posed by the conveners oft his 
symposium was: "What is the historical meaning of feminist law 
journals? What resonance do they have for law students, professors, and 
lawyers today and at their inception?" Perhaps one answer is that 
almost twenty years ago, feminist law journals were established to 
create safe spaces for students and professors interested in gender 
issues, considered soft scholarship. 
Twenty years later many of the subjects embraced in the early years 
of feminist journals, like reproductive freedom, equal employment 
opportunities, rape, sexual harassment, and domestic violence, have 
become mainstream, and are as likely to appear in traditional law 
journals as they are to appear in feminist law journals.1 Articles by 
women legal scholars on a wide variety of legal topics appear with 
regularity in all types of law journals. So, do you agree with my starting 
premise about the reason for feminist law journals, or is that premise 
also contested? 
Penny: I agree with your first premise. However, one could argue about 
whether contemporary feminist legal scholarship, although still treated 
with some skepticism in traditional legal circles, is no longer regarded 
as "soft" scholarship. But your premise about the origins of feminist 
law journals is correct. 
Taunya: On second thought, however, our premise that feminist 
scholarship has been accepted in mainstream law reviews may be 
illusory since an article by Laura Rosenbury that also appears in this 
issue of the journal, looking at the content of law journals between 1978 
and 2002, found that only 189 out of 1 ,63 7 "feminist" articles were 
published in mainstream law journals? On the other hand, your 
defmition of what constitutes feminist scholarship may differ from 
Professor Rosenbury's. Thus, the difference between perception and 
reality may depend on the feminist issue presented and whether the 
1 See Laura A. Rosenbury, Feminist Legal Scholarship: Charting Topics and 
Authors. 1978-2002, 12 Colum. J. Gender&. L 446 (2003) (comparing contents of articles in 
feminist journals and feminist articles in prestigious law reviews). 
2 !d. at 447-48. 
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argument being advanced in the article is consistent with or at odds 
with what we call mainstream legal scholarship. Some issues, usually 
involving formal equality, are clearly mainstream, while other issues 
are not.3 
Penny: I do not know if I would accept at face value this clear 
demarcation betweeri "mainstream" and "other." I am not sure that this 
binary takes account of the contextualized and fluid nature of these 
concepts. I think that these definitions need to be problematized 
somewhat, since what is mainstream is often contingent on a whole host 
of extra-legal factors, including timing. If one, for example, looks at the 
development of the 1 aw regarding sexual harassment, you notice that 
the issues moved from the margins to the mainstream fairly rapidly. 
Most of these developments occur not so much in a linear fashion, but 
rather as a consequence of extra-legal processes which impact on the 
perception of the issue, that is, mainstream or other. 
Taunya: Perhaps a more accurate statement is that some forms of 
contemporary feminist legal scholarship have become mainstream, but 
not others, and then ask whether these "less conventional" feminist 
theories are more likely to be found in feminist journals than in 
mainstream journals. Perhaps feminist journals need to exist to help 
feminists push the envelope to provide a space to discuss "less 
conventional" feminist subjects and theories and promote more honest 
intra-feminist critiques. We are in need of a new coherent, all-inclusive 
vision of feminism to replace the mainstream American model. Thus, 
the goals of feminist law journals must be reworked to provide a forum 
for non-white women and less powerful women globally. 
Penny: But have feminists succeeded in pushing the envelope? I think, 
as a general proposition, that one can think of mainstream feminist 
journals as succeeding on many levels, and possibly even with respect 
to inclusivity. I want to return to the original point about the raison 
d'etre for feminist law journals, that is, the production ofknowledge 
from a feminist perspective and access to know ledge for women and 
other scholars committed to principles of gender equality. One can 
argue that the feminist legal project in this regard has been 
successful. In other words, feminist law journals have provided an 
indispensable context for the development of alternative approaches to 
legal knowledge which place women's concerns at the center.4 
3 Professor Rosenbury found that few journals, feminist or mainstream, contained 
articles about women and poverty. !d. at 458-59. 
4 See Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender (Katherine T. Bartlett 
& Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991). 
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What has been essential in the reproduction of a feminist 
epistemology has been the challenge to concepts such as "objectivity" 
and "neutrality." Here feminist legal scholars have been fellow travelers 
with other critical legal scholars (especially those who focus on 
questions of racial discrimination and wider questions about justice). In 
other words, the challenge to the "natural order" of racial hierarchies in 
this country also allowed for the challenge to the "natural order" of 
gender hierarchies.5 
If I were exploring these questions in a longer paper, I would go 
beyond the borders of this country to explore the role of feminist law 
journals in examining and highlighting the feminist condition rendered 
by global processes of exclusion and marginalization. My exploration 
oft hese i ssues would raise questions about the relevance of feminist 
legal scholarship to the lives of less affluent women around the globe 
and the possibilities for legal and other reforms generated by such 
scholarship. 
Taunya: Your last point about the role of feminist law journals in 
examining and highlighting the global feminist condition with respect 
to marginalization and exclusion is important, and seems confirmed by 
Professor Rosenbury's study.6 A harder question, however, is how to 
determine whether an article accomplishes this goal. I am thinking 
about Isabelle Gunning's cntlque about Western feminists' 
condemnation of genital mutilation--without consulting or considering 
the perspective of the non-Western women whose rights they claimed 
to protect--the imposition of Western values and perspectives on non-
Western cultures.7 
Penny: More importantly, and distinct from the question of 
accountability to those whose rights are apparently being protected (the 
non-Western abused woman), is the very concept of "culture." My 
impression is that feminist law journals have interrogated quite 
thoroughly the subordination of women through a variety of cultural 
5 For a discussion a bout these issues in the Australian con text, see Penelope E. 
Andrews, Violence Against Aboriginal Women in Australia: Possibilities for Redress from 
the International Human Rights Framework. 60 Alb. L. Rev. 917 (1997); see also Critical 
Race Feminism: A Reader (Adrien Katherine Winged., 1997). 
6 Rosenbury, supra note I. 
7 Isabelle Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and Multicultural 
Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 Col urn. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 189, 191 
(I 992). A more recent example is the unintentionally harmful interventions by feminists and 
human rights groups on behalf of A mina Lawai during ongoing judicial proceedings. Ms. 
Lawai was sentenced to death by stoning under Nigerian Shari'a Penal Legislation for 
allegedly having a child out of wedlock. 
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mechanisms in non-Western soc1et1es, or m minority non-Western 
communities within the United States. Sometimes feminist scholars 
have accomplished this laudable task with or without the collusion of 
non-Western feminists who live in the United States, or the country in 
which the particular culture is located.8 What is of concern to me, and 
goes back to your point about "pushing the envelope," is whether this 
has been done in a theoretically candid manner. 
What do I mean by this? The discussion about culture always 
occurs as if culture is "out there." As some Third World feminists point 
out, often culture is treated as if it belongs only to the "other."9 So, the 
discussion in feminist law journals, even when driven by feminist 
sensibilities of solidarity and the new feminist universalism, does not 
take account of the culture within the United States.10 
Let me offer an example: this country is probably one of the more 
formally equal societies in the world. Yet one of the phenomena of this 
liberated society is the excessive amount of money that middle-aged 
and middle-class women spend on cosmetic surgery and products such 
as botox to reduce the ravages of age. What kind of liberation is this? 
What kind of culture a !lows women to engage in a form of physical 
mutilation to avoid the inevitability of aging? What kind of cultural 
message is being transmitted to young women; that equality is not so 
much about changing women's material conditions (wages, conditions 
of employment, fundamental rights to reproduction, and so on) but 
more about c ontinuing an image of women that takes us back a few 
centuries? It is an elitist preoccupation that has enormous cultural and 
economic consequences for all women in this society. 
Taunya: Are you critiquing the hyper-capitalism and materialism of 
late twentieth-century America, or does the dominance and prominence 
of Western (predominately United States) cultures imply overshadow 
other types of physical enhancements done by women in other 
countries-some, but not all, influenced by the Western media? I am 
thinking of genital circumcision, or the popularity of skin lighteners and 
hair straighteners in African and Caribbean countries. 
Cosmetic surgery also is fairly routine for middle-class and affluent 
women in Latin American countries like Brazil and Eastern countries 
8 See L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and 
Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision. 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 275 
(1997). 
9 See, e.g., Gunning, supra note 7; see also Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of 
Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the "Native" Sybject in International/Post-Global 
Feminist Legal Politics, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 1 (2002). 
10 See Fedwa Malti-Douglas, As the World (or Dare I Say the Globe) Turns: 
Feminism and Transnationalism, 4 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 137 (1996). 
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like Japan and South Korea. Women's global concern with physical 
enhancements simply illustrates how, even in affluent countries where 
women have more wealth, real power and wealth still! ies with men. 
Perhaps Virginia Woolf was wrong when she said that women need 
their own money and a room of their own. These things do not seem to 
solve the problem, and I suggest that Andrea Dworkin might have been 
on to something in her book Intercourse. 11 Too many affluent 
heterosexual American women, like other heterosexual women around 
the world, are still overly concerned with attracting men, whether to 
provide financial support, as companions, or to gain approval (fathers, 
employers, etc.). 
Penny: I am not sure if I would put genital circumcision alongside skin 
lighteners and hair straighteners. Even though genital surgeries are 
culturally mandated, they lack the aspect of voluntariness that is 
arguably key to the beauty industry. I know that voluntary is a loaded 
term, but genital surgeries are imposed on girls by adults. But this may 
just be a minor point. 
What one has to look at is how the law intervenes in these 
situations, and particularly how feminist legal theory, and by extension 
feminist law journals, have played a part in providing either a healthy 
and rigorous critique of these practices, or whether feminists really have 
only a muted response to these issues. 12 There have been some 
interesting analyses by feminist social theorists, anthropologists, and 
philosophers, but feminist legal theorists have lagged somewhat behind. 
If I had to imagine the kind of intervention that feminist law 
journals could make, it would be an attempt to disentangle the different 
layers of feminist subordination and discrimination by focusing on 
outward manifestations of discrimination that the law could more easily 
address. So, for example, there would be universal consensus about 
legal equality (the right to vote, equal pay, and so on). I would venture 
to argue that despite its current controversy in the United States, even 
reproductive issues, iff ramed in a privacy argument, would generate 
sufficient agreement for legal reform. What would be more 
11 Dworkin's theory is that because of the physical design of women's bodies and 
the existence of sexual intercourse, women have less bodily privacy then men. Andrea 
Dworkin, Intercourse (1987). As Linda McClain said, explaining Dworkin's theory, "[T]here 
is never a real privacy of the body that can co-exist with intercourse." Linda C. McClain, 
Inviolabilitv and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary. and the Body. 7 Yale J.L. & Human. 
195,222 (1995) (quoting Dworkin, supra, at 122-23). 
12 There is a wonderful series of essays dealing with these difficult questions and 
raising them in contexts of autonomy, responsibility, gender roles, and reproductive capacity. 
See "Nagging" Questions: Feminist Ethics in Everyday Life (Dana E. Bushnell ed., 1995); 
see also Cheryl B. Preston, Baby Spice: Lost Between Feminine and Feminist, 9 Am. U. J. 
Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 541 (200 I). 
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controversial, and therefore result in fewer consensuses, would be these 
different cultural questions involving, for example, beauty 
competitions, cosmetic surgery, botox injections, and skin lighteners. 
Law's imperatives may not be appropriate here. 
Taunya: I also asked whether feminist law journals have failed to 
fulfill their promise. There is little discussion in most feminist law 
journals about working with all women as equal partners, or 
championing issues, like racism, that might work against the economic 
interests of affluent Western women. Articles a bout reproduction and 
child-rearing appear with frequency in feminist and mainstream 
journals, yet few legal scholars question the unresolved tension within 
feminism about the value of mothering, non-capital producing labor, 
compared with capital producing labor outside the home. 13 If mothering 
is so important to society and to some women, then feminist journals 
might convene symposiums to address the consequences of twentieth-
century feminism that stressed equality outside the home but failed to 
resolve equality issues inside the home. Feminists generally have failed 
to address and resolve the issue of unpaid labor in the home and why 
this labor remains women's work. 14 
Penny: I want to respond here to your particular point about the lack of 
attention to working with women as equal partners. This raises a 
question that is central to the legal academy, and goes back to the 
earlier point about the establishment of feminist law journals. The 
disconnection between the arcane world of the academy and the "real 
life" problems of people is apparent. For example, you and I have often 
lamented the proliferation of law reviews. Not to denigrate the 
important scholarship being pursued in many journals-which the 
courts and other actors in the legal system no doubt find useful on 
occasiolr-but as long as law reviews serve as vessels for the pursuit of 
tenure, the relevance of much of the theoretical enquiry will be 
questioned. Do not get me wrong; I am not making an anti-intellectual 
argument. I am merely raising an issue that I believe some scholars are 
grappling with, particularly progressive scholars. There are some 
13 See generally Taunya Lovell Banks, Toward A Global Critical Feminist Vision: 
Domestic Work and The Nanny Tax Debate, 3 J. Gender Race & Just. I (I999); Katharine 
Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 Yale J.L. & Feminism 8I, 
I 00-04 (I997). Ironically, in some ways the nineteenth-century feminists who claimed a 
property right in their household labor were far ahead of contemporary feminists. See Reva 
B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claim Concerning Wives Household 
Labor. I850-I880, I03 Yale L.J. I073, I075 (I994); see also Mona Charen, Will Feminists 
Open Their Minds to Motherhood?, Bait. Sun, Oct. 28, 2002, at 9A. 
14 Twila L. Perry, Caretakers. Entitlement. and Diversity, 8 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. 
Pol'y& L I53, I56 (I999). 
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academics whose work has some real life application--I am thinking of 
William Julius Wilson's work on social welfare15 and Catharine 
MacKinnon's on sexual harassment 16 and of course there are many 
others. Feminist journals were supposed to be different. They were set 
up, amongst other things, not to mimic mainstream law reviews but to 
provide a space where women's issues could be dealt with thoughtfully. 
It is in this regard--the failure to include women who are 
marginalize~that to some extent feminist law journals have fallen 
short of one aspect of their mission. 
This is particularly the case with racism. Questions of 
intersectionality have been pursued by a few j oumals, and they have 
pursued them with vigor and creativity. I wonder, though, how 
widespread these theoretical developments are. 
Taunya: Perhaps feminist journals were never set up to bridge or 
address the gap between the academy and the bar, to provide a space to 
discuss praxis. In fact, I would argue that early feminist writers were 
very theory-oriented, with people theorizing on issues that came from 
practice, but with very few so-called feminist scholars proposing 
anything more radical than treating women the same as men under the 
law. Thus, you had critical legal feminists advancing arguments on why 
a formal equality approach would not work, and these scholars 
fragmented over whether biological versus social versus bio-social 
reasons explained why formal equality would not work. 17 Arguably, the 
only thing that was different about these discussions from the 
discussions in the mainstream journals was that women, not men, were 
at the center. Of course, the problem was with the universalizing of 
women as white, heterosexual, middle or upper class, Christian or 
Jewish, and Western, particularly American. 
Penny: It may be opportune here to raise the point about the theoretical 
connections between the elimination of racial discrimination and gender 
discrimination, which some feminist law journals have explored. 
15 See, e.g., William Julius Wilson, The Bridge Over the Racial Divide: Rising 
Inequality and Coalition Politics ( 1999); William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: 
The World of the New Urban Poor (1996); William Julius Wilson, The Truly 
Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass. and Public Policy ( 1987); William Julius 
Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions 
(1978). 
16 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life 
and Law 103 (1987); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words 43 (1993); Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination (1979); 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist State (1989). 
17 See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, DeConstructing Gender, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 797 
(1989). 
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Taunya: But have these journals explored this issue on a consistent 
basis, or do they do so in a more token fashion--like Black History 
Month is set aside for an examination of black issues? 
Penny: I think that feminist law journals have followed the general 
trend in law journals, focusing on a particular subject through the 
symposium method. So a symposium is held on a particular subject 
area, which also forms the basis for the volume of the journal. My sense 
is that a significant number of I aw journals have dedicated particular 
volumes to the question of the intersectionality of race, gender, 
ethnicity, and sexuality. I cannot comment on whether these endeavors 
have been conducted in a tokenistic manner. 
Taunya: One area where feminist law journals could do more is by 
examining and highlighting the global condition of women, by 
exploring how non-Western women are exploited, marginalized, and 
even excluded from full participation in their societies, sometimes by 
other women. The real issues affecting less affluent Western and non-
Western women are not likely to get much exposure in fora supported 
by elite Western I aw schools. As I wrote several years ago, feminist 
journals and feminist legal scholars seldom focus on how affluent, 
usually Western women exploit and oppress other women. 18 
Penny: To go back to the point about the link between the elimination 
of gender oppression and racial oppression, one example that comes to 
mind has been the constant tension between national liberation and 
women's liberation. This was a theme of the civil rights struggle in the 
United States, and also central to other contexts in which the centrality 
of racial discrimination almost erased attention to gender 
discrimination. Here I particularly think of the South African context 
where feminist legal developments in the United States and elsewhere 
assisted in shaping an indigenized version suitable for South Africa's 
hybrid conditions of Western and African, and where competing claims 
of gender equality and ethnic/national identities are constantly being 
negotiated.19 
Taunya: Were South African feminists really successful in getting their 
Issues incorporated into the reformulation of South Africa's 
18 Banks, supra note 13, at 27; see also Regina Austin, Of False Teeth and Biting 
Critiques: Jones v. Fisher in Context, IS Touro L. Rev. 289, 397 (1999); Donna E. Young, 
Working Across Borders: Global Restructuring and Women's Work, 2001 Utah L. Rev. I. 
19 See Penelope E. Andrews, Striking the Rock: Confronting Gender Equality in 
South Africa, 3 Mich. J. Race & L. 307 (1998). 
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constitution? I find it a bit ironic that gay men, rather than women, have 
benefited most directly from some of South Africa's constitutional 
equality provisions. Am I wrong in this regard? 
Penny: South African women clearly succeeded in incorporating 
women's rights in the Constitution and, in fact, rendered equality the 
primary principle in the Bill of Rights. The South African Constitution 
contains the most comprehensive listing of rights for women (and other 
groups). Gay men, and a host of other groups, have clearly benefited 
from the new constitutional dispensation, and have successfully 
challenged a host of discriminatory laws in South Africa.20 But this 
question of access to the courts is a large issue that we do not have time 
to pursue here. Suffice it to say that despite the fact that black women, 
the most disadvantaged group of people in South Africa, have not had 
access to the South African Constitutional Court in the same way that 
other more privileged groups have, black women will benefit directly 
from the equality jurisprudence emanating from the Constitutional 
Court.21 
Taunya: Maybe I am expecting too much of feminist law journals. 
Journal membership and publication still are closely tied to traditional 
male-defined notions of success. For students, journal membership or 
publication leads to prestigious clerkships, associate positions in white 
shoe law firms, and even law professorships. After law school, 
publication in a legal journal increasingly is a prerequisite for being 
hired as a law teacher. Further, for law teachers, scholarship, whether 
published in a feminist or mainstream journal, is linked to promotion 
and tenure in the academy. 
One last question raising perhaps a thornier issue is what if we are 
wrong? What if the articles in these journals are much broader and 
more representative than the articles in mainstream journals? Does this 
mean that feminist journals are doing their job? Why would we think 
that they are not? Is it because some feminist journals have themselves 
become mainstream, and those feminist journals that are more 
representative are less "prestigious" and less read? 
20 See, e.g., National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice 
1999 (I) SA 6 (CC); see also Satchwell v. President of Republic of South Africa 2002 (6) 
SA I (CC). 
21 See President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo CCT 11196; see also S v. 
Baloyi CCT 29/99; Carrnichele v. Minister of Safety and Security CCT 48/00 (2001 SACLR 
LEXIS 64). All of these cases provide a comprehensive definition of equality, one that 
eschews a version of narrow formal equality and embraces substantive equality. 
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Penny: I do not know how to answer this question, except to say that 
we all operate in the mainstream, even as feminists. The tools of our 
trade are mechanisms to engage with the law. Law reform is our most 
fundamental endeavor. That makes us very mainstream. There is, of 
course, a wider debate in the I aw and society movement, the critical 
legal studies and critical race theory approaches, feminist legal theory, 
and post-colonial and postmodern schools about the possibilities for 
progressive lawyering. But as long as we have law as part of the 
description of our work products, we are confined to a mainstream 
paradigm. 
Taunya: So you are saying that some feminists may have initially seen 
feminist law journals as safe spaces for feminist scholars-women and 
men-who want to air feminist issues while seeking tenure. But instead 
of creating a new type of journal, feminist law journals tend to replicate 
the traditional law journal model, only the focus is different. In 1938, 
Virginia Woolf warned us that as women gain equal status and power in 
society, they tend not to favor substantive change of that society.22 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that today feminist law journals, like most 
scholarly journals, have little resonance for feminist I awyers because 
the articles tend, like most journals, to be too theoretical or esoteric.23 
CONCLUSION 
Our conversation is more a critique of the past than a recipe for the 
future, but we need more open and honest conversation among and between 
feminists and non-feminist women. These conversations will be difficult, 
often uncomfortable and incomplete. Not only do race and sexuality 
separate us, but increasingly, careerism as well. 
The seeds for some of these conversations are found in the writings 
of second- and third-generation legal feminists and non-feminists. Some 
feminists question what they see as a feminist orthodoxy or canon in which 
they are not included. In a similar vein, other feminists argue for writing 
outside of feminism as a way to address issues affecting some women who 
do not seem part of the late twentieth-century feminist canon. A few 
established feminist scholars are troubled by these discussions. Despite the 
seeming acceptance of feminist legal theory within the academy, these 
feminist scholars still feel insecure and vulnerable inside their institutions, 
especially when younger feminists challenge their scholarship. Too many 
22 Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas (1938). 
23 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education 
and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 41-42 (1992); Harry T. Edwards, The 
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 
Mich. L. Rev. 2191,2198 (1993). 
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feminist legal scholars do not trust each other enough to have the kind of 
open and probing conversations needed to move feminist legal theory 
forward. In the final analysis, in a society in which divisions along race, 
class, sexual orientation, ideology, and other lines still persist, trust may be 
a casualty. 
Before meaningful conversations can occur among feminist legal 
scholars, we need to find a basis of commonality and trust. In the meantime, 
there are multiple feminist legal projects, some complementary, which 
show great promise. Thus, as we enter the twenty-first century, feminist 
legal scholars must be willing to engage feminist legal scholars as well as 
women scholars and activists who do not identify themselves as feminists. 
Feminist law journals may be able to provide both the public and private 
space to pursue these conversations. 
